Turkey's relationship with the F-35, the fifth-generation fighter jet, dates back to the early 2000s. The F-35, which was developed after the F-22 project, the first fifth-generation fighter jet in the world, became a symbol of unity and security for the Western Alliance. Subsequent tensions resulted in Turkey's purchase of the S-400 air defence system and its exclusion from the F-35 Project. In this article, the F-35 and fifth generation fighter jets will be examined, Turkey's place in this project will be explained in detail, the S-400 air defence system purchased from Russia and the events that developed as a result of this purchase process will be shed light on, and finally, the possible consequences of returning to the F-35 programme will be analysed.

With the 4th generation fighter jets, the aviation and defence industry underwent a major transformation and revolution. The transition from the analogue system to the digital system called ‘fly-by-wire’ and the transfer of the main tasks of flying the aircraft to a limited artificial intelligence computer after this technological transformation, and as a result, the transformation of the pilot from the person who flies the aircraft to the person who manages its flight are among the most radical changes in the defence industry and aviation sector, especially in the late 70s and 80s.

The first example of the fifth-generation fighter aircraft, for which development processes were initiated, was the F-22 fighter aircraft, which entered the US inventory in 2005. These aircraft differ from their predecessors by a major technological difference: Design features that provide very low radar cross-sections, network-centric warfare infrastructure, highly developed environmental awareness, over-the-horizon warfare infrastructure, etc. (For example, the F-35 aircraft has seven million lines of computer code and uses a hundred times more parameters in threat identification than a 4th Generation aircraft. According to Air Force Magazine, the radar cross-sectional area of the 4th generation F-16 is 4m², while the radar cross-sectional area of the F-35 is 0.005m². States with 5th generation aircraft such as the F-35, which is even less visible on radar than the pigeon with a radar cross-sectional area of 0.01m², gain great air superiority).

The F-35 programme, America's second fifth-generation fighter jet project, was initiated by an initiative known as JAST (Joint Advanced Strike Technology). The purpose of this initiative at the beginning was not to design and develop a new fighter aircraft, but to develop the technology required for the next generation fighter aircraft. After Lockheed Martin's prototype was deemed suitable by the US Department of Defence, Northrop Grumman and BAE System were selected as subcontractors in 2001, and Lockheed Martin was given a 10-year development period and the first F-35A model left the hangar in 2006.

During this period, the United States established a Consortium of nine states to develop joint defence systems with its allies and to develop, produce and sell the F-35 fighter jet. The countries in the consortium were recognised as having a share in the production in proportion to their contribution to the development of the aircraft and their capacities. At this stage, the USA, the main manufacturer and the largest customer of the aircraft, was excluded from the classification. However, the United Kingdom is the only state that made a first level contribution to the development of the aircraft with 2.5 billion dollars. The second level partners are Italy with an investment of 1 billion dollars and the Netherlands with 880 million dollars. Third level partners are: Turkey with $195 million, Canada with $160 million, Australia with $144 million, Norway with $122 million and Denmark with $110 million. Turkey has been involved in the Joint Strike Fighter (F-35) Project based on the decision of the Defence Industry Executive Committee (SSİK) dated 12 July 2002.

During this period, the Turkish government and Turkish companies have played an active role in the production and development of the F-35. These companies have undertaken design and production tasks in various parts and systems of the aircraft.

The main Turkish Defence Industry Companies that have been involved in the project and their roles are summarised below:

TAI is the sole source for the production of the centre fuselage of the F-35A aircraft outside the United States. In addition, composite and metallic parts of the centre fuselage, the air receiver, the air external load carrier and the adapter are also prepared by TAI.

AYESAŞ is also producing the panoramic cockpit screen of the F-35. In addition, it undertakes the production of missile control interface cards as a single source.

Alp Aviation manufactures parts of the main and nose landing gear, some structural parts of the aircraft, and various components for the F-35's engine, the F135.

ASELSAN is working on avionics systems and optical components used in the aircraft's targeting system.

HAVELSAN has also undertaken the establishment of Turkey's F-35 Integrated Pilot and Maintenance Training Centre.

On the other hand, Turkey has also worked on missiles and ammunition to be used in the F-35. ROKETSAN and TÜBİTAK SAGE developed the SOM-J cruise missile, while ASELSAN and TÜBİTAK SAGE redesigned the Precision Guidance Kit for use in the F-35.

Following all these production and development activities, on 21 June 2018, Turkey received its first aircraft from the 100 aircraft order to be procured under the F-35 Project in Fort Worth, Texas. Since then, the number of aircraft produced for Turkey has reached six, but as a result of the S-400 air defence system crisis with the US, the aircraft produced for Turkey were delivered to the US Air Force.

S-400 AIR DEFENCE SYSTEM AND TURKEY:

Turkey's need for an air defence system has been based on tensions with Iraq, Iran and Syria on its southern borders and the need to acquire an air defence system since the mid-1990s to counter missile threats from these countries. Turkey had previously assigned the task of eliminating missile threats to its airspace to F-16 fighter jets, but the importance of ground-based radar-assisted defence systems, rather than an airborne intervention, has come to light over time.

Since the early 2000s, the Undersecretariat for Defence Industries has been holding tenders for the procurement of air defence systems without any results. However, with the outbreak of the Syrian Civil War in 2011, ensuring the security of the airspace became an important strategic priority for Turkey. In this context, in order to meet Turkey's urgent need, the USA, the Netherlands and Germany deployed Patriot Air Defence Systems in Turkey in 2012, based on an application to NATO. Currently, anti-missile systems of Spain and Italy are deployed in Turkey as part of NATO missions.

While Turkey's search for these systems continued, the main criterion that Turkey expected to be met from the air defence systems to be procured from abroad and from the companies developing these systems was the realisation of ‘Technological Transfer’.

Following these initiatives, Turkey started to search for new options, which included the US Patriot Air Defence System, the Russian S-400 Air Defence System and the SAMP-T System produced by MBDA, an Italian-French consortium in Europe. One of the clearest developments regarding the ‘technology transfer’ move, which was one of the conditions put forward by Turkey regarding the Patriots, took place in 2013. In this year, Turkey applied to the US, its ally, to meet its land and air defence system needs, but Turkey's request to purchase Patriot missiles through technology transfer was not met by the US Congress and the request was rejected on the grounds that it did not comply with the ‘American Intellectual Property Act’, which led to the suspension of the Patriot purchase attempts. After unsuccessful tender processes and the request to the US, the first tender process in 2013 decided to purchase the FD-2000 Air Defence System developed by the Chinese company CPMIEC, which met Turkey's expectations, but the purchase of this system was also abandoned as a result of the company being under US sanctions, the loss of intention to carry out the technology transfer and the discomfort from NATO circles. However, negotiations on the European SAMP-T system were also being held during the S-400 negotiations. In particular, the Consortium's will to transfer technology to the new generation of the SAMP-T system to meet Turkey's needs was also expressed during these negotiations, but these negotiations could not be concluded successfully.

After the cancellation of the tender awarded to the Chinese company, Turkey first announced that the ‘National Missile Production Project’ would be established. Later, on 11 April 2017, Turkey announced the signing of an agreement for the purchase of S-400 missiles from Russia in a deal worth $2 billion 500 million. However, no assurances were given to Turkey from the Russian side regarding the transfer of technology from the S-400 missiles to the country, which Turkey insisted on and presented as a prerequisite. The Pentagon said that the S-400 missiles are not compatible with NATO systems, while NATO said that Turkey's purchase of air defence systems from Russia would have ‘consequences’. In response to such rhetoric from the West, Turkey received its first S-400 delivery on 12 July 2019.

How does the system work?

  • The long-range surveillance radar tracks objects in the air and sends the information to the command vehicle. Potential targets are evaluated by the command vehicle.
  • After the target is identified, the command vehicle decides to launch the missile.
  • The launch data is sent to the launch vehicle, which is in the best position in relation to the target, from where the surface-to-air missiles are launched.
  • Engagement radar helps the missile to reach its target.

Why do the US and NATO oppose Turkey's S-400 purchase?

The US opposes Turkey's S-400 systems for many reasons:

  • The concern that Turkey, one of NATO's most strategic members, will weaken the common security architecture by developing a relationship with Russia, the alliance's most important adversary.
  • The risk of losing Turkey, one of the most important customers of the US defence industry, to other producers.
  • The fact that Turkey's S-400 procurement will be subject to sanctions as it falls within the scope of the Countering America's Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA) enacted by the US Congress in August 2017, and thus a new blow will be dealt to Turkish-American relations.
  • Concern that the S-400 radar system could intercept the sensitive and superior features of the F-35, the 5th generation fighter jet that Turkey is also involved in the production programme and will deploy.

From NATO's perspective, two factors stand out. First, Turkey's S-400 air defence systems cannot be integrated into NATO's existing defence and radar systems in any way.

Second, and more importantly, NATO-Russia relations. Turkey's recent close co-operation with Russia, its development of the Astana Process to end the Syrian civil war, and at the same time its increasingly tense relations with its traditional Western allies, particularly the United States, on Syria and other issues are being closely monitored by NATO.

Turkey's decision to acquire the S-400 defence systems is further complicated by the fact that Russia is still NATO's biggest adversary as it celebrates the 75th anniversary of its founding, and is in the process of new military build-ups in both Eastern Europe and the Black Sea region in terms of deterrence.

As a result of Turkey's continued procurement and testing of the S-400s, the White House decided on 17 July 2019 to suspend and remove Turkey from the global F-35 Joint Strike Fighter partnership. On 21 April 2021, Ankara was notified that Turkey was officially removed from the programme.

In response to the purchase of the S-400, on 14 December 2020, the United States imposed sanctions against İsmail Demir, President of the Presidency of Defence Industries (SSB); Faruk Yiğit, Deputy President of SSB; Serhat Gençoğlu, Head of the Air Defence and Space Department of SSB; and Mustafa Alper Deniz, Program Manager of the Regional Air Defence Systems Directorate of SSB, under Section 231 of the Countering America's Adversaries Through Sanctions Act, due to the Presidency of Defence Industries' role as the primary defence procurement agency of the Republic of Turkey and its responsibilities in the development of the defence industry. Turkey was not directly sanctioned under this law, but was subjected to a secondary sanction for working with a Russian company sanctioned by the US and for entering into commercial and strategic agreements.

In the light of these developments, the S-400 air defence system has turned out to be the most costly, if not the most expensive, defence and security system Turkey has procured in the last 20 years.


Recently, there have been allegations that the S-400s were sold to another third country, such as Pakistan or India, and that in return for the fulfilment of this condition, the US was asked to return to the F-35 project and demand F-35 aircraft. According to the allegations, Turkey was said to have requested 1 squadron of F-35s and 1 squadron of F-35Bs from the US on the condition that Turkey would not use the S-400 air defence systems.

In response to the many different interpretations made regarding these allegations, a statement came from the Ministry. According to the statement made by the Ministry of National Defence, it was stated that the S-400 air defence system is in the inventory of the Turkish Armed Forces and that there is currently no new development on the subject. The relevant statement is as follows;

"The system requirement for our country's air defence needs continues. In this context, the S-400 air defence system is in the TAF inventory. Currently, there is no new development regarding this issue. "

According to the US press, Turkey could sell the S-400s to Pakistan or India without disrupting its relations with Russia, thus trying to return to the programme.

So what would Turkey's return to the F-35 programme and possible F-35 purchase bring to Turkey?

1. NATO Relations and Western Alliance

Strengthening NATO Ties: Turkey's return to the F-35 programme could strengthen its position within NATO. The F-35 programme plays a critical role in ensuring NATO's air superiority, and Turkey's reinstatement could enhance its military integration within the alliance.

US-Turkey Relations: Tensions between the US and Turkey have increased in recent years, particularly in relation to the purchase of the S-400 air defence system. Turkey's return to the F-35 programme could help to ease these tensions and open a new chapter in bilateral relations.

2. Relations with Russia

Increased Tensions with Russia: Turkey's re-entry into the F-35 programme could complicate its relations with Russia. Russia may adopt a negative attitude towards the delivery of F-35s to Turkey, which could lead to tensions in Turkey-Russia relations.

S-400 Debate: A return to the F-35 programme could lead to new discussions on how Turkey will position the S-400 system. In particular, as we have explained above, the recent news reports may lead to a move to sell these systems to third countries such as India or Pakistan. We believe that this is unlikely to happen. Because there is an end-user commitment in the contract of such strategic weapon systems. Russia sold it to Turkey for Turkey. It would not be possible for Turkey to sell this material to a third country without Russia's permission. Turkey can sell these systems only if Russia gives permission.

While these discussions were ongoing, the US added a clause on the S-400 to its annual National Defence Security Authorisation Act. According to that clause, the lifting of sanctions triggered by the S-400 purchase is conditional on Turkey's ending its ownership of the S-400 system. This condition, which can be expressed as ‘Seize possession’ in full English, is a very difficult criterion. Because it does not seem likely that Turkey will throw away a material for which it has paid 1.3 billion dollars. If this is to be resolved, both the American side and Ankara need to be a little more flexible about the conditions. Rather than giving up the ownership of the systems as a common solution here, it would be a healthier step to give an assurance that these systems will not be operationalised and to bind these systems to the fifth or fourth article of the NATO Treaty.

In this context, based on the principle that an attack on one of the member states of the alliance within the scope of Article 5 is considered to be an attack on all NATO members, the condition of operationalising the S-400 can be considered as a more rational agreement for both sides.

3. Regional Balance of Power

Eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East: Turkey's re-inclusion in the F-35 programme could increase its military power in the Eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East. This could increase Turkey's effectiveness and deterrence in the region, but could also raise concerns in neighbouring countries.

Relations with Greece: Greece will carefully monitor Turkey's return to the F-35 programme. This could further complicate already tense relations in the Aegean Sea and the Eastern Mediterranean.

4. Defence Industry and Technology Transfer

Impact on the Defence Industry: Turkey's return to the F-35 programme could provide the domestic defence industry with access to technology at international standards. This could make Turkey's defence industry more competitive. As a country that has been producing a significant portion of F-35 parts for a long time, both the transfer of developing technologies and the increase in production capabilities will be an important gain for the country's industry. It is also possible to achieve a significant gain in the development and production stages of KAAN, the National Fighter Aircraft.

Technology Transfer: As part of the F-35 programme, technology transfer and cooperation opportunities may increase, which may contribute to the development of Turkey's military technology. In particular, the re-signing of the pre-existing agreement for the repair of F-35 fighter jets in the European Region to be carried out in Turkey is expected to contribute to the technological development in the country and to the transformation of industry 4.0 announced at the Hannover Fair in 2011. It is clear that the development of the industry in Turkey has become more frequent and concentrated in the field of defence industry, and that any development in this field will create an important breakthrough for the development of other sectors.

CONCLUSION

Turkey's return to the F-35 programme and the question of how the S-400s will be used remain on the agenda. For the $1.25 billion Turkey paid for the F-35s, the purchase of F-16s and the modernisation of existing aircraft were on the agenda after the failure to acquire these fighter jets. As a result, the most important move that the US expected from Turkey was Sweden's acceptance to NATO membership. On 26 January 2024, following the publication in the Official Gazette of President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan's approval of the law adopted by the Turkish Grand National Assembly, on 26 February 2024, the US Congress approved the agreement on the sale of 40 F-16 fighter jets to Turkey and the purchase of kits for the modernisation of 79 fighter jets. For the time being, a temporary air defence system phase has been created in the F-16 issue, especially in terms of modernising aging fighter jets and increasing the missing air capability. The reason for this temporary solution is that 20 of Turkey's first indigenous and national fighter aircraft, the KAAN, are expected to be delivered to THK by 2028, and then, by 2030, these fighter aircraft are expected to replace the old F-4 and F-16 type aircraft in the TAF inventory. In the coming years, the delivery of the F-35 fighter jets ordered by Greece and Turkey's having to wait for the commissioning of indigenous and national fighter jets may change the balances in the region.